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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the privacy issues associated with personal
information collected and used by the government. The E-
Government Act of 2002 requires government agencies to use
Privacy Impact Assessments to address the privacy concerns of
new government information collection schemes, for instance, with
government websites and airline passenger pre-screening systems.
However, even with the privacy assessments, airline passenger
pre-screening systems have encountered some questions as to
whether adequate measures exist to protect passenger privacy.
This article will discuss the developments in 2004 associated with
passenger pre-screening systems. Privacy issues are also
implicated by the government's use of data mining. Data mining
allows the government to analyze data collected, including
personal information, and convert it into a useful form. This article
will discuss the uses of data mining, such as for terrorism
prevention, on the federal and state government levels as well as
the privacy concerns associated with government data mining.
INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment provides that citizens shall be free from
unreasonable government intrusion. This provision has been
interpreted by the courts as a right to privacy against government
intrusion.1 The collection of information by the government and the
use of that information are seen by some as an intrusion by the
government, thus requiring privacy protection. The major privacy law
that governs government information collection is the Privacy Act of
1974 , which regulates the federal government's use of personal
information by restricting and monitoring agencies' collection,
disclosure, and use of personal information. The intersection of
* The authors are both J.D. candidates at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law,
class of 2006. Sayaka Kawakami holds a B.A. in political science and communications from
the University of Washington. Sarah McCarty holds both a bachelor's and master's degree in
business administration from Ohio University.
1U.S. CONST. amend. IV, http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html#Ar4.
2 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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government information collection and privacy encompasses a broad
variety of topics and programs. This article focuses on the most
pertinent topics affecting privacy today and the new developments in
the field over the past year. Privacy impacts with regard to
government websites, Transportation Security Administration data
collection and usage, and restrictions on government data mining have
been recent sources of change.
Both new electronic technology and the threat of terrorism in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have led the
government to adopt new information collection schemes, which
create new privacy concerns among citizens. In order to address such
privacy concerns, Congress adopted the E-Government Act of 2002 ,
requiring government agencies to submit privacy impact assessments
(PIAs), which identify privacy concerns and ensure privacy
protection. The Act also mandates that the Office of Management and
Budget issue guidelines to federal agencies for their websites to ensure
that privacy of citizens who access their sites is protected. Even with
these new government website privacy policies and PIA procedures,
some of the concerns over individual privacy still remain unsolved.
This problem can be seen in the implementation of new programs,
such as CAPPS II and Secure Flight, both of which were proposed to
identify terrorists using computer-assisted passenger screening
systems.
Government data mining is present at both the federal and state
levels. The Total Information Awareness Program (TIA) emerged
after September 11, 2001, to create technologies for terrorism
prevention but was quickly disassembled. Other federal data mining
systems were spawned from the TIA or originally created, and are
currently used by fifty two federal agencies. The passage of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20044, has
granted greater authority to pursue government data mining, but also
placed more severe checks on the program. The MATRIX program
has provided data mining to the states. Currently, only five states are
participating in this federally funded, privately operated system. As
the technologies used in data mining increase, the conflicts with
privacy protection increase. Two primary issues that have arisen are
the use of private database contractors to supply information to the
government, and how to balance the usefulness and efficiency of data
mining against the need for privacy protection.
3 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 36).
4 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 401).
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This article focuses on the details of these debates and challenges.
Each topic is analyzed to determine the new developments in the
federal and state governments, recent cases and controversies in the
subject area, interesting topics or debates, and a brief analysis of the
future direction of government information collection. The first part
focuses on Privacy Impact Assessments and Computer-Assisted
Passenger Screening Programs. It focuses its discussion on the role of
Privacy Impact Assessments on government websites and CAPPS II.
The article then turns to the developments in these areas during 2004,
such as the Crew Vetting Program, No-Fly Lists, and Secure Flight.
The second part of the article covers government data mining. This
scction discusses data mining efforts and privacy concerns on the
federal level regarding the Total Information Awareness Program and
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and on
a state level by looking at the MATRIX program. The article provides
analysis of how the government can balance privacy with useful data
mining, and how privacy is affected by data mining from private
institutions. The second part concludes with a projection into the
future of government data mining.
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS AND COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER
SCREENING PROGRAMS
In the last few years, the federal government has established the
use of Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), which were created to
answer privacy concerns of new government information collection
schemes. This section discusses PIAs mandated under the E-
Government Act of 2002. Government agencies have not received
much criticism concerning the privacy policies of government
websites even though more and more people use the Internet as a tool
to contact the agencies. On the other hand, new measures proposed by
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on computer-
assisted airline passenger pre-screening systems, such as CAPPS II
and Secure Flight, have spurred some criticism from the public despite
the fact that the TSA issued PIAs to ensure that all privacy issues are
addressed in implementing those measures. First, this section will
discuss the E-government Act of 2002 and the authority given to the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement the privacy
provision of the Act. Then, this article will discuss the application of
the Act to government websites and computer-assisted airline
passenger pre-screening systems.
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I. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA)
Federal agencies are required by law to issue a PIA whenever they
collect information from the public by electronic means. The
following subsection gives a brief introduction to PIAs.
A. BACKGROUND
In 2003, forty million Americans visited a government website for
information, up fifty percent from the previous year.5 The increased
use of electronic tools by citizens led Congress to pass the E-
Government Act of 2002,6 which went into effect on April 17, 2003.
The purpose of the Act is to foster the use of information technology
(IT) for the agency's business among citizens by making it more
citizen-oriented and user-friendly.7  In order to achieve this purpose,
Congress believed that it was important to protect the privacy of
citizens when they interact with the federal government through the
use of IT.
8
Section 208 of the Act mandates that the OMB issue guidance on
implementing the privacy provision of the Act.9  The section
specifically requires that each government agency "conduct privacy
impact assessments before developing or producing information
technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information that is
in an identifiable form."' 0 This provision also applies in a case where
5 Pamela M. Prah, E-Government Use Up 50 Percent, Surveyfinds, STATELINE.ORG (May
25, 2004), at http://www.stateline.org/live/
ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=1 36&languageld=1 &contentld= 15659.
6 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 36),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_congpubliclaws&docid=f:pub 1347.107.pdf.
7 Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Implementation Guidance for the E-Government Act of 2002, M-03-18 (Aug. 1, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-18.pdf.
8 Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Director, Office of Management and Budget, OMB
Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, M-03-
22 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/print/m03-
22.htmi.
10 E-Government Act of 2002, supra note 3.
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an agency initiates a new collection of information that "will be
collected, maintained, or disseminated using information technology
or includes any information in an identifiable formpermitting the
physical or online contacting of a specific individual.' I In addition,
agencies are required to update PIAs when a system change creates
new privacy risks.' 2 Those changes include conversion from paper-
based records to electronic systems, changes in collecting information
from anonymous to non-anonymous, significant system management
changes, significant merging, centralization, and matching with other
databases, matching of information with commercially available
information, alteration in the character of the data, new public access
with passwords and digital certificates, new interaency uses, and
changes in internal flow or collection of information. 1
The OMB guidance defines a PIA as "an analysis of how
information is handled by federal agencies."' 14 The purposes of PIAs
are to ensure information handling conforms to applicable legal,
regulatory, and policy requirements on privacy, to determine the risks
and effects on privacy of collecting, maintaining, and disseminating
information of citizens in identifiable form in an electronic
information system, and to examine and evaluate protections and
alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential
privacy risks.15 The OMB specifically requires that a PIA address the
following: what information is to be collected, why the information is
being collected, the intended use by the agency of the information,
with whom the information will be shared, how the information will be
secured, whether a system of records required under the Privacy Act of
1974 is being crafted, and whether a privacy policy is in machine-
readable format. 16
1 Bolten, supra note 7.
'
21d.
13 Id.
' 
4 id.
15 Id.
16 Bolten, supra note 7.
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i. GOVERNMENT WEBSITES
Since 1999, the OMB has been requiring federal agencies to state
the nature, purpose, use, and sharing of information collected on their
websites in their "Privacy Policy." 17  Particularly, on "cookies,"
federal agencies could only use them or other automatic means of
collecting personal information if they give a notice of those
activities.1 8 The 2003 OMB Memorandum, mandated under the E-
Government Act of 2002, additionally requires that agencies
implement changes regarding privacy to their websites by December
15, 2003.19 Under the new mandate, agencies must place notices on
their websites explaining agency information handling practices
labeled as "Privacy Policy."2  The Privacy Policy must address: (1)
consent to collection and sharing, and (2) rights under the Privacy Act
of 1974 or other privacy laws. Furthermore, agencies must adopt
machine-readable technology so that site users are alerted
automatically when site privacy practices do not match their personalautoaticlly 22
privacy preferences. Additionally, agencies are required to develop a
timetable for translating their privacy policy into a standardized
machine-readable format. 3 However, these new policies do not apply
to information other than that on government agency intranet sites that
24are not accessible by the public and national security systems.
17 Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Privacy
Policies on Federal Web Sites, M-99-18 (Jun. 2, 1999), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m99-18.html.
18 Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Privacy
Policies and Data Collection on Federal Web Sites, M-00- 13 (Jun. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m00-13.html. A cookie is a file on a Web user's
hard drive that is used by Web sites to record data about the user.
19 Bolten, supra note 7.
20 id.
21 Bolten, supra note 7. Such statutes include the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, and the I.R.S. Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.
22 Bolten, supra note 7.
23 id.
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ii. STATE GOVERNMENT WEBSITES
Currently, thirty-one states place some sort of privacy policy notice
on their websites. At least sixteen of those states have a statute
requiring government websites to establish privacy policies and
procedures, or to incorporate machine-readable privacy policies into
their websites. These states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New York, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia.26
iii. COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER SCREENING SYSTEM
a. BACKGROUND
Computer-assisted airline passenger pre-screening systems involve
the collection of passenger information using electronic databases.
Thus, issuance of a PIA is mandated to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) by the E-Government Act of 2002 in order to
ensure that a proper privacy policy protects the TSA from misusing
such information. The privacy policy of each computer-assisted
airline passenger pre-screening system is discussed in the following.
b. CAPPS
In fear of the increasing threat of terrorism, the federal government
had been using a computer-based passenger screening system called
the Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS)
since 1998. CAPPS was operated by U.S. commercial airlines, each of
which kept separate computer systems. CAPPS analyzed information
in passenger name records (PNRs).27 The information was collected
25 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATIVE WEB SITE PRIVACY POLICIES
(2005), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/nalit/legprivacypol.htm (last updated Jan. 4,
2005).
26 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAW RELATED TO INTERNET PRIVACY
(2005), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/eprivacylaws.htm (last updated Jan. 3,
2005).
27 Information collected for PNRs varied among airlines. It may include passenger name,
reservation date, travel agency or agent, travel itinerary information, form of payment, flight
number, and seating location.
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when passengers made flight reservations with the airlines.28 Under
CAPPS, passengers who fit a certain behavioral profile, such as those
who buy a one-way ticket or pay by cash, were subjected to extra
screening. 29 Under the CAPPS system, half of the hijackers involved
in the terrorist attacks on September 11 th were flagged, but it did not
prevent the attacks. 30  The TSA later pointed out that the amount of
information in PNRs under CAPPS was very limited because of the
unclassified nature of the system.
3 1
c. CAPPS II
In November 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act,32 which mandated that the newly-created
TSA within the Department of Transportation 33 replace CAPPS with a
new computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system in order to
evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft.34 The task of
developing the new program was given to the Office of National Risk
Assessment, which eventually developed a program known as CAPPS
11. 35
CAPPS II would take the procedure away from the airlines and
hand it over to the TSA. Upon reservation of an air flight, the airline
28 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, REPORTS, FORMS, AND RECORD KEEPING
REQUIREMENTS: AGENCY INFORMATION COLLECTION AcTvITY UNDER OMB REVIEW; SECURE
FLIGHT TEST PHASE, Docket No. TSA-2004-19160, 2-3, available at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/airtravel/sf pra.9.21.04.pdf.
29 Sara Kehaulani Goo and Robert O'Harrow, Jr., TSA Readies RevisedAviation Screening,
THE WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/
wp-dyn/A33830-2004Aug25?language=printer.
30 id.
31 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 28, at 3.
32 Pub.L. No. 107-71 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 114), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/majorlaw/107-71 .pdf.
33 Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the TSA became a component of the Department
of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. 6 U.S.C. § 203(5) (2005).
34 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER
PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, GAO-04-385, 6
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04385.pdf.
35 Id.
[Vol. 1:2-3
KAWAKAMI & MCCARTY
requests that the passenger provide his or her name, home address,
home phone number, and date of birth.36 Then, the airline enters the
information into the PNR37 which is sent electronically to CAPPS II,
managed by the TSA.38 Sometime before the day of the flight, CAPPS
II would request an identity authentication from commercial data
providers.3 9 Based on an identity authentication score the commercial
database identified, CAPPS II would conduct risk assessments using
government databases, including classified and intelligence data, to
categorize the passenger into one of three classes: an acceptable risk,
unknown risk, or unacceptable risk.40 When the passenger checks in
for a flight at the airport, the passenger's risk class will be transmitted
41from the CAPPS II to the check-in counter. Passengers who are an
acceptable or unknown risk will receive a boarding pass encoded with
their risk level so that checkpoint screeners will know the level of
scrutiny required.42 Those people with unacceptable risk would not be
allowed to fly, would undergo police questioning, and risk possible
arrest.43 Those with unknown risk would be subject to extra screening
by TSA agents at the airport screening gate.44
B. DEVELOPMENT IN THE YEAR 2004
In 2004, the TSA's proposal of CAPPS II received criticism from
both Congress and the public. This eventually led the TSA to propose
and test alternative methods of computer-assisted passenger screening
36 Id.
37 PNR contains data related to a traveler's reservation and travel itinerary, and is contained in
an air carriers reservation system.
38 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34 at 7.
39 id.
40 Id.
41 id
42 Id.
43 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, CAPPS H: GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE VIA
PASSENGER PROFILING, at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/cappsii/background.php (accessed Jan.
20, 2005).
4Id.
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systems, such as the Registered Traveler Pilot Program, Crew Vetting
Program, and the Secure Flight Program. The latest scheme, Secure
Flight, is still unfolding.
i. CAPPS II
CAPPS 11 received scrutiny from Congress in 2003. The
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, passed in 2003,
prohibits the TSA from receiving funding for CAPPS 1n in the fiscal
year ending September 30, 2004, until the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) submits a report to the Committees on Alpropriations
of both the Senate and House by February 15, 2004. The Act
mandated that the GAO address eight key issues, the first six of which
show that the development and operation of CAPPS II is effectively
managed and monitored, and that the system will function as
intended.46 Those six issues are: (1) establishment of an internal
oversight board by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
monitor the development of the system; (2) assessment of database
accuracy in order to avoid producing a large number of false positives;
(3) creation of a test system and the demonstration of efficacy and
accuracy of the system; (4) installment of operational safeguards to
protect the system from abuse; (5) installment of security measures to
protect the system from unauthorized access; and (6) establishment of
effective oversight of the system's use and operation.47 The last two
issues involve public assurance that adequate measures exist to protect
passenger privacy: (7) addressing all privacy concerns with the
system; and (8) creation of a redress process for passengers to correct
erroneous information. 48 On the eighth issue, the GAO must show that
CAPPS II ensures that a system of due process is in place when
passengers of an aircraft pose a threat and are delayed or prohibited
from boarding scheduled flights.
49
45 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-86, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
useftp.cgi?IPaddress= 62.140.64.21 &filename=h2555rs.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/1 08_
congbills.
46 id.
47 id.
48 id.
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As required by the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, the GAO issued an assessment of CAPPS II titled
"Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges" to
Congressional committees in February 2004.50 The report identified
delay in the development of CAPPS II. For example, testing and
developing the initial increments of CAPPS II faced some delay partly
due to the difficulty in obtaining passenger data needed to test initial
increments. 51 Also, the TSA had not established a complete plan on
how functionality of the system would be delivered, the schedule for
delivery, and the estimated costs of CAPPS II development.
52
Specifically, the GAO raised concerns that the TSA has not fully
addressed seven of the eight issues identified bA Congress under the
Security Appropriations Act discussed above. The first issue -
establishment of an internal oversight board - was the only one fully
addressed by the TSA. The TSA addressed this issue when the DHS
created the Investment Review Board to review DHS's capital asset
programs with contracts exceeding fifty million dollars in order to
ensure that projects meet mission needs at the expected levels of cost
and risk.5
4
On the second issue, there is no industry standard of accuracy
assessment: each commercial provider uses different criteria to assess
accuracy.55 Also, there is no consistent system for collecting accuracy
data among the government databases.56V On the third issue lack of
data delayed demonstration of system efficacy and accuracy. On the
fourth and fifth issues, critical elements of the security program,
including security policies, a system security plan, and certification
and accreditation of the security system, had not been implemented.58
50 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34.
5' Id. at9.
52Id. at 9-10.
5Id. at 13.
54 1d. at 13-14.
55 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34, at 14.
56 id.
" Id. at 16.
58 1d. at 18.
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On the sixth issue, the measures and goals for CAPPS II addressed by
the TSA had not provided enough objective data necessary to conduct
oversight. 59 In addition, the TSA had not fully established the system
to ensure that the program would be properly monitored and
evaluated.6 °
On the seventh issue on public assurance of privacy, the GAO
stated that the TSA had not finalized its plan to comply with the
Privacy Act of 1974 by addressing all privacy concerns. The OMB
guidance requires that an agency proposing to exempt a system of
records from the Act must explain the reason why it wishes it to be
exempted, and the TSA had not done so.
6 2
According to the GAO, the TSA submitted its plans to address
privacy issues in compliance with the Privacy Act.63 For example, the
TSA addressed an intention not to collect passengers' social security
numbers from commercial databases and to destroy most passenger
information after they have completed their travel itinerary. 4 This is
consistent with the collection limitation practice of the Act.65 Also, it
proposed to prohibit commercial data providers from using
information they receive from the TSA for commercial purposes.
This 6 practice is consistent with the use limitation practice under the
Act. Furthermore, the TSA also made proposals to provide
passengers with a Privacy Act notice. By doing so, the TSA sought to
explain its authority for collecting their information and its principal
purposes, to provide other information as the Act requires, to perform
real-time auditing and testing in order to identify data quality
problems, and to improve accuracy.
68
59 id. at 20-21.
60 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34, at 20-21.
6 1 Id. at 23-24.
621d. at23.
63 Id.
6 id
65 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34, at 23.
66 Id. at 23-24.
6 7 Id. at 24.
68 id.
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However, the GAO noted that the TSA's plans gave rise to several
privacy concerns. First, the TSA planned to exempt CAPPS II from
the Privacy Act's requirements that an agency maintain only
information about an individual that is relevant and necessary to
accomplish a proper agency purpose. 69 The GAO stated that this
policy raises concerns that the TSA may collect and maintain more
information than necessary for the purpose of CAPPS 11.70 The GAO
also speculated that TSA might use this information for new purposes
in the future.7' Secondly, TSA's plan to prohibit passengers from
accessing their personal information obtained by CAPPS II raises the
concern that inaccurate personal information would remain
uncorrected in the system and continue to be used.72
The public raised similar concerns about CAPPS II. In Alaska,
four plaintiffs filed a suit against the TSA and the DHS in the U.S.
District Court of Alaska on May 24, 2004, claiming3 that CAPPS II
would violate their constitutionally protected rights. Two of four
plaintiffs are U.S. citizens and Alaska residents who frequently use air
travel because they live in a remote location.74 The two other
plaintiffs are Frontier Travel and Airlines Online, travel agencies that
reserve commercial flights for customers in Alaska. 75 The plaintiffs
claim that CAPPS II was intended to reach beyond terrorism. This
was apparent by TSA's statement entitled "CAPPS II at a Glance,"
that passengers with outstanding warrants for a "crime of violence"
would face arrest.76 They also claimed that defendants intended to
implement CAPPS II by a secret order, so that there is no way for
passengers to know if their information is collected.77 Under the
69 Id.
70 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34, at 24.
71 id.
72 id.
73 Brief for Frontier Travel at 11-12, Frontier Travel v. Transportation Security Administration
(D. Alaska 2004), available at http://209.123.170.170/alaskadocs/
FrontierTravel_v_TSAcomplaint.pdf.
74 Id. at 4-5.
71Id. at5.
76Id. at8.
77 Id. at 11.
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Privacy Act of 1974, agencies must give actual notice that personal
information is being collected, so that an individual can bring a timely
claim challenging violations of his or her rights.78 The plaintiffs
requested the court to enjoin CAPPS II until the TSA and the DHS
change their policies so they are in compliance with the Privacy Act.
The plaintiffs also wanted notice provided when the agencies issue an
order to implement the program. 79 The case is still pending in the
court, and its status after the TSA's abandonment of CAPPS II is
unknown.
ii. REGISTERED TRAVELER PILOT PROGRAM
The TSA proposed the Registered Traveler Pilot Program (RT
Pilot) on June 1, 2004, and issued its PIA on June 24, 2004, in order to
assess a new type of passenger screening sastem mandated under the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The new pilot program
was strictly voluntary, and allowed a registered traveler to provide
personal informationg' which would be run through terrorist-related
and criminal databases. If the passenger's information matches certain
criteria set by the TSA, the information would be forwarded to the
TSA for additional screening.82 After the review, names of passengers
considered to pose a security risk would be sent to law enforcement
and/or intelligence agencies for detention or further investigation. 83
The TSA claimed that this layered procedural approach would prevent
innocent people from being scrutinized at airports. The TSA also
stated that it would use technical safeguards to prevent information
from abuse and conduct privacy trainings for its agents, the DHS, and
78 Brief for Frontier Travel at 10-11, supra note 73.
79 1d. at 12.
80 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, REGISTERED TRAVELER PILOT: PRIVACY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Jun. 24, 2004), available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
PIARTOMB.pdf.
81 It includes full name, social security number, other names used, home address, home
telephone number, cell phone number, email address, date of birth, place of birth, nationality,
gender, prior addresses for the past five years, drivers license number, and biometric
identifiers (finger printing and/or iris scan). Id.
82 Id.
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contractor staff who would have access to passenger information.8 4
Because of the short duration of the program, however, the TSA
makes clear that it does not provide any remedial measure for a person
to correct erroneous information.85 Despite these notifications, it is not
clear if the TSA ever implemented this pilot program.
iii. CREW VETTING PROGRAM
The TSA also announced the Crew Vetting Program and issued its
86PIA on June 28, 2004. In October 2001, the Federal Aviation
Administration issued an Emergency Amendment (EA) which
required that countries highly concerned about security submit cockpit
crew lists identifying names, dates of birth, places of birth, and
pilot/flight engineering license numbers.87 In December 2003, due to
additional air security concerns, the TSA issued security directives and
modified the EA by extending the scope to cover all flights flying
over, in, and out of the United States, and to collect passport numbers
in addition to those previously required. 88 On March 30, 2004, -the
TSA further modified the EA, by extending the coverage of the
program to include cabin crews and persons on all cargo flights, and
by requiring the agency to gather more information from these
individuals, such as gender and job classification.8 9
The procedure for processing the crew information would be the
same as it was for CAPPS II; it runs the information on various
government databases - both non-classified and intelligence - to see if
anyone matches with people of high security concern.90 The PIA
ensures that the information is used strictly for air safety purposes,
even though it would be shared with other government agencies and
intelligence, and that those who believe that the information the TSA
84 id
85 Id.
86 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR CREW
VETTING PROGRAM (Jul. 28, 2004), available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
PIACVPDHSCPO.pdf.
87 1d. at2.
88 id.
89 Id.
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has on them is not correct can seek redress through U.S. embassies
abroad. 91 The TSA had not determined, however, how long a record
would be retained in its database. 92 So far, the extent to which the
TSA has implemented this program is unknown to the public.
iv. No-FLY LIST
Aside from the CAPPS II, Pilot, and Crew Vetting Programs, the
TSA maintains a No-Fly List, "a list circulated to commercial airlines
and security personnel with instructions to detain and question any
passen er whose name matches or is similar to one on the No-Fly
List."9 -F The List contains two different lists of individuals considered
to be threats to air security: a no-fly list, which contains names of
individuals who are prohibited from taking a flight, and a selectee list,
which contains names of individuals who must go through additional
security screening. 94 The TSA started implementing this program in
November 2001.
Some organizations, individuals, and members of Congress raised
concerns over the No-Fly List. A class action was filed regarding the
No-Fly List in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington by the ACLU of Washington on April 6, 2004.96 The
Court heard the ACLU's argument on November 4, 2004. 9 This case
involved seven plaintiffs and others similarly situated.9 8 Upon check-
in at airline counters, the plaintiffs were often informed by airline
personnel that they would have to wait for long hours because there
91 PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR CREW VETTING PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 5-6.
92 id.
93 Brief for Green at 1, Green v. Transportation Security Administration (D. W.Wash. 2004),
available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfim?ID= 15419&c=272.
94 Id. at 4.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1.
97 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Federal Court Hears Arguments in ACLU's
No-Fly List Case: ACLU Says Government List is Flawed and Violates Rights of Passengers
(Nov. 4, 2004), at http://www.aclu-wa.org/Issues/otherissues/FedCrtNoFly.html.
98 Brief for Green, supra note 93, at 1.
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were problems in issuing boarding passes.99 Some were informed that
their names matched or were similar to the names listed on the No-Fly
List.'00 The plaintiffs claimed that, as a result, they could not make
scheduled flights and were inconvenienced, interrogated, and
humiliated in front of other passengers, and received extra security
checks at security checkpoints, even though they do not have any
relation to terrorist organizations or have outstanding criminal
records. 10' The plaintiffs argue that the TSA did not explain why they
were identified by the No-Fly List. !1 2 In response, the plaintiffs have
brought due process actions under the Fifth Amendment and privacy
actions under the Fourth Amendment, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. 103
The No-Fly List received additional criticism from the public and
Congress. At a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee in August
2004, Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts stated that he had
repeatedly been refused permission to board flights between
Washington, D.C. and Boston in April of that year, because his name
has been placed on the No-Fly List. 1°4 Because Senator Kennedy
continued to have the problem even after the Secretary of the DHS,
Tom Ridge, acknowledged the problem and apologized to him,
Senator Kennedy was concerned about redress procedures for citizens
who do not capture the attention of senior officials. 10 5 Georgia
Representative John Lewis also testified that his name had been on the
List.10 6 The ACLU raised a similar concern about the No-Fly List,
stating that there was "no effective mechanisms for removing names or
identifying innocent passengers" and that not everyone was informed
99 Id. at 3-24.
1O1 Id.
12 Id.
103 Brief for Green, supra note 93, at 26-27.
104 Shaun Waterman, Senator Gets a Taste of No-fly list Problem, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug.
20, 2004 available at http://www.washingtontines.com/upi-breaking/20040819-082444-
1551r.htm.
106 Kehaulani Goo, supra note 29.
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of the current TSA system of ombudsman for remedy. 0 7  In
September 2004, 680 people filed claims for redress, and the TSA
managed to clear only 250 by October. 10
8
Also in 2004, the media reported several cases of inappropriate
conduct by U.S. commercial airlines where they turned passenger
information over to government agencies without any proper
procedure. In February 2004, the DHS revealed that JetBlue Airways
turned over PNRs, which were supposedly used for a purpose other
than air safety, to a Department of Defense contractor.109 American
Airlines also admitted sending data to ovemment contractors
sometime after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Similarly, Northwest
Airlines acknowledged that it passed passenger information over to
NASA in September 2001.11
V. SECURE FLIGHT
Based on these criticisms, the TSA abandoned CAPPS II and
introduced a new program called Secure Flight in September 2004.
The goals of Secure Flight are: (1) to identify passengers known or
suspected to be terrorists before flights; (2) to conduct efficient and
quick passenger screening; (3) to reduce the number of passengers
unnecessarily selected for secondary screening and better target known
terrorists by excluding passengers without risk; and (4) to protect fully
passengers' privacy and civil liberties."12 In order to implement the
program, the TSA mandated U.S.-based airlines to turn over PNRs
107 Waterman, supra note 104.
108 Christopher Elliott, Getting Off a Security Watch List is the Hard Part, THE N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2004, at C8, available at http://travel2.nytimes.com/mem/travel/article-
page.html?res=9AODE6D71E3DF931A35752C 1A9629C8B63.
109 Steven Roberts, Big Brother is Watching You, 27 NAT'L L. J. 15, (2004).
110 Jay Boehmer, TSA Demands PNR Data: Secure Flight Program Renews Privacy Issues,
BUSINESS TRAVEL NEWS, Oct. 4, 2004, available at http://www.btnmag.com/
businesstravelnews/headlines/frontpagedisplay.jsp?vnucontentid= 1000651781.
I1 Id.
1 2 Justin Oberman & Lisa Dean, Transportation Security Administration, Secure Flight,
Presentation and Proposal to ASAC (Sept. 30, 2004). PowerpointM slides of the presentation
are available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
SecureFlightASACPresenation.ppt#2.
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from June 2004 by October 29, 2004.113 This is estimated to include
the records of fifty-four million Americans. 1 4  The TSA would
compare airline PNR data to government and commercial data, and
determine which components of the PNRs are necessary for pre-
screening cross-checks once it completes testing.' TSA also began a
30-day period of soliciting comments from the public about Secure
Flight on September 23, 2004.116 The TSA assured that it would
establish comprehensive passenger redress procedures, and personal
data and civil liberties protections for the Secure Flight program.' 
17
Secure Flight eliminated some of the controversial elements of
CAPPS II. For instance, during the pre-screening phase under CAPPS
II, the system could identify passengers with outstanding arrest
warrants and refer them to law enforcement agents, whereas the
Secure Flight system would only identify those suspected to be a threat
to air flights. 1 Under Secure Flight, the TSA takes over the task of
running airline passenger information with the "No-Fly List," which
was previously conducted by airline employees. 19 The TSA stated
that this procedure would allow the government to draw on a broader
array of names of suspected terrorists from other intelligence
agencies. 120
The TSA published the PIA on the Secure Flight test phase on
September 21, 2004.121 The TSA identified several privacy issues and
promised that it would fully protect passengers' privacy and civil
113 Boehmer, supra note 110.
14 Scott McMurren, Give Thanks for Year's Blessings, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 26,
2004, at G4.
115 Oberman, supra note 112.
16 Boehmer, supra note 110.
117 Oberman, supra note 112.
'1 Roberts, supra note 109.
1 19 Kehaulani Goo, supra note 29.
120 id
121 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT; SECURE
FLIGHT TEST PHASE, TSA-2004-19160 (Sept. 21, 2004) available at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/airtravel/sf pia_9.21.04.pdf.
2005]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
liberties. In the use of commercial databases,' 22 the TSA stated that it
would test them only to identify instances in which passenger
information is inaccurate or incorrect, and that it would not store the
commercial data. 123 The test is strictly conducted "to ensure accuracy,
efficacy and reliability.', 124  Concerning notice or opportunities to
consent, the TSA commented that airline passengers should be aware
of certain things. The TSA said that by engaging in air travel,
passengers have consented to certain screening protocols because
passenger screening has already been in place and there are numerous
media reports about the new program. 1
25
According to the TSA, passenger information would be shared
with TSA employees and contractors who have a "need to know" in
order to conduct the required test, and would be used solely for the
purpose of testing the Secure Flight program. 126  The security of
databases would be safeguarded in accordance with the Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2002127 and also with
policies and rules established by the TSA and the DHS. 128 Collected
information will be retained by the TSA at the Office of National Risk
Assessment in a secure facility for a period of time necessary to
conduct and review the test. 129 In the near future, the TSA will issue a
record retention schedule, which shows how much information is
retained by the agency. 130 In addition, the agency will make sure that
122 Commercial databases include those services to banking, home mortgage and credit
industries. Id. at 5.
121 Id. at 5-6.
124 Id. at 4.
125 Id. at 6.
1261d. at7.
127 Pub. L. No. 107-347. (This act "established government-wide computer security and
training standards for all persons associated with the management and operation of Federal
computer systems." TRANSPORTATION SECuRITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 121, at 7.)
128 Such rules include password protection and firewall protection. TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 121, at 7-8.
129 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: SYSTEM OF RECORDS;
SECURE FLIGHT TEST RECORDS, TSA-200419160, available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/
assetlibrary/SecureFlightSORN9.21.04.pdf.
1
30 Id.
[Vol. 1:2-3
KAWAKAMI & MCCARTY
a proper redress procedure is in place and that passengers have access
to their own PNRs.131
Along with the PIA, the TSA gave a thirty-day period for the
public to comment on Secure Flight.i 32 On November 10, 2004, the
TSA issued a report titled "Notice of Final Order for Secure Flight
Test Phase and Response to Public Comments on Proposed Order."133
In this notice, the TSA responded to the public comments submitted
during the thirty-day period. In the report, the following eight issues
of public concerns regarding Secure Flight were identified: (1) the
program's effects on privacy and civil liberties; (2) the routine use of
information; (3) passenger consent to the use of PNRs; (4) the absence
of redress mechanisms; (5) concerns over the use of commercial
databases; (6) the efficacy of the program; (7) TSA's compliance with
the Privacy Act of 1979 and other laws, regulations, and rules; and (8)
potential conflicts with the European Union's privacy laws. 1
34
The Final Order answered those concerns raised by the public.
The National Business Travel Association (NBTA) stated that the TSA
should balance the need to establish better security with policies and
procedures that protect civil liberties and privacy. 135  Also, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) raised a concern over
the TSA's previous statement that the Secure Flight test phase should
be exempted from the provisions of the Privacy Act. 36 An example of
such a provision is the right of individuals to access government
information about them. 137 The TSA justified its actions by stating
that the Privacy Act specifically allowed agencies to exempt
information regarding national security or law enforcement concerns
from the Act's authority. 138 In answering the eight questions, the TSA
131 Id.
132 id.
133 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, NOTICE OF FINAL ORDER FOR SECURE FLIGHT
TEST PHASE; RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED ORDER AND SECURE FLIGHT TEST
RECORDS, TSA-2004-19160 (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/
assetlibrary/secureflightfinalorder.pdf.
114 Id. at 7.
135 Id. at 8.
136 Id. at 9.
137 id.
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mostly repeated its PIA by saying that it will take steps to ensure
privacy, and described the same precautions and measure the agency
said it would take.
139
As a result, the Final Order only has a few changes from its
original plans announced in September. 140 The program applies only
to flight segments completed in June 2004, instead of PNRs with flight
segments before June 2004. 141 The order also clarifies that the program
applies to public charter flights, while international flights to and from
the U.S. are completely excluded from the program.
42
The TSA estimates that testing of the new program will continue
through spring to early summer 2005 when the first airlines are
expected to begin implementing the system. 43 After the test phase is
completed, if the TSA implements Secure Flight as a permanent
program, it must face the GAO's objective evaluation.144 This process
is required by law and the TSA cannot implement its plan until after
GAO's approval. 1
45
Secure Flight still faces some criticism from the public. For
instance, the Business Travel Coalition, which represents American
businesses, commented that the new program is another CAPPS II and
just a "replacement for the original CAPPS.' 46
GOVERNMENT DATA MINING
Government agencies and departments gather information for
various purposes. The collection of data is useless unless the data has
meaning, however. The government and various private entities are
now taking data mining a step further, by gathering various data into
one source and then analyzing it to obtain new data. This is the
... Id. at 7-26.
140 Id. at 26.
141 Id. at 27.
142 id.
141 Kerry Ezard, First US Carriers to Implement Secure Flight in Late Spring, AIR TRANSP.
INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 1, 2004.
144 Boehmer, supra note 110.
145 id.
146id.
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process known as data mining. This process is being used
commercially to assist businesses in targeting consumers and
improving processes, as well as by state and federal governments for a
variety of purposes. The government's use of data mining programs
requires a balance between privacy interests and effectively using
available data for useful purposes.
Privacy concerns have been raised with regard to several federal
government initiatives, such as the defunct Total Information
Awareness Program and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004,147 as well as state data mining projects like the
Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX).
Discussions are currently underway to determine how government data
mining can be limited to protect privacy, while maintaining or
enhancing its usefulness. The use of private institutions as a source for
government data mining is also a topic of current debate. The
following analysis deals with these federal and state programs, as well
as general debates and controversies that were prominent throughout
2004.
I. DATA MINING OVERVIEW
It is important to understand the nature of data mining, in both the
private and public sectors, before one can evaluate federal and state
data mining programs and the privacy concerns that arise from the use
of those programs. The following section gives a broad overview of
data mining by analyzing how it is defined, the purpose of the
technique, and the extent to which the government uses it. The last
component focuses on the concerns and challenges that arise from
government data mining.
A. DATA MINING DEFINED
Data mining has been defined to incorporate many parameters of
the process, including technology, analysis, extraction, and knowledge.
The General Accounting Office defines data mining as the
"application of database technology and techniques - such as
statistical analysis and modeling - to uncover hidden patterns and
subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the
147 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (codified at 50
U.S.C. 401).
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prediction of future results."'148 Simpler definitions focus on the fact
that data mining is a "technique for extracting knowledge from large
volumes of data"'149 or that the process looks for "trends or anomalies"
in the data.' 50  With regard to recent government uses for data mining,
the technique can be defined as the use of "computer technologies to
sift through large data repositories to identify threatening patterns and
people" in an effort to predict crime or terrorist activity
prospectively. '51
Data mining has a variety of uses. Many consider it to be a "sense-
making application" because it brings meaning to large
conglomerations of raw data that previously did not make sense
separately. 152 The information that is used is known information that
has generally been previously disclosed, and may be an accumulation
of information from a variety of sources. Data mining then develops
information that was previously unknown by the system out of the
known data.' 53 This unknown information that is generated may be a
hidden pattern that can be used to predict future behavior. 5 4 These
predictions prove to be valuable for commercial uses, such as
developing marketing strategy, or for public use.
Data mining was originally a product of IBM. 155 However, it is
currently developed and used by numerous private and public entities.
Not only does the government develop its own data mining processes,
but it also purchases this technology from other private or educational
148 U.S.GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE
RANGE OF USESI GAO-04-548 (May 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04548.pdf.
149 Eric J. Sinrod, What's Up with Government Data Mining?, USA TODAY (June 9, 2004),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnistlericjsinrod/2004-06-09-sinrodx.htm.
"' SOURCEWATCH, Data Mining, at http://www.sourcewatch.org/
wiki.phtml?title=Datamining (last modified May 27, 2004).
151 Anita Ramasastry, The Safeguards Needed for Government Data Mining, FINDLAW (Jan. 7,
2004), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040107.html.
152 K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security. Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of
Data, 5 CoLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 6 (2003/2004).
153 Id.
154 SOURCEWATCH, supra note 150.
155 Id.
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institutions.1 56  For example, ChoicePoint is one of the largest
suppliers of data to the government.15 7  This company has nearly
fourteen billion records from which it mines data, and makes the data
available to the government.' 58  Data mining usually involves
computer software that "extracts information from databases, as well
as text, voices, other audio, video, graphs, images, maps, and
equations and chemical formulas."'159 It then uses this information to
search using varying parameters such as sequence, clustering,
association, classification, and forecasting to determine information
about a specific subject or to determine a pattern. 160
B. PURPOSE OF DATA MINING
Government data mining is used for a variety of purposes
throughout the federal and state structures. The most recognized use
of government data mining is the analysis of intelligence to detect
terrorist or criminal activities or patterns. 61 Although this is a purpose
served through government data mining, the reach of the process is
much wider. The most common use of data mining cited b
government agencies was to improve service or performance.
°6
Government agencies also specified other uses, such as managing
human resources activities or patterns, detecting and preventing fraud,
and generating statistics to be used in audits or investigations.167
156 Associated Press, Controversial Government Data Mining Research Lives On (Feb. 23,
2004), THE MERCURY NEWS at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/
editorial/8022436.htm.
157 Peter Jennings, No Place to Hide: Freedom and Identity, (Jan. 20, 2005), at
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/Primetime/story?id=429308&page= 1.
158 Lee Tien, Privacy, Technology andData Mining, 30 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 389, 389 (2004).
159 Associated Press, supra note 156.
160 SOURCEWATCH, supra note 150; Jeffrey W. Seifert, Data Mining: An Overview,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (Dec. 16, 2004).
161 Thomas Claburn, GAO Raises Privacy Concerns about Federal Data Mining,
INFORMATIONWEEK (June 4, 2004), at http://informationweek.constory/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=21401674.
162 Id.; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 2.
163 U.S.GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 2,3; Claburn, supra note 161.
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Many programs for government data mining are conducted for
research and development purposes. These programs will later be
used by various government and private institutions but are currently
being refined to enhance their usefulness. Many believe that the
technology will be developed, with or without government
involvement; therefore, it is better for the government to develop it so
there are checks on the potential invasion of privacy from the
technology. 164 The argument rests on the idea that the government is
generally more accountable to the public than private institutions.
Others counter this argument by undermining the basis of the
argument. They believe that the private sector is subject to stricter
privacy standards than the government. 165 For example, the private
sector has significant restrictions on the release of personal financial
data under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which the government is not
subject to. 166
C. USAGE OF GOVERNMENT DATA MINING
After September 11, 2001, the United States government was
chastised for its inability to "connect the dots" and prevent the terrorist
attacks. Due to this criticism, the government made updating
information technology a priority, and "information sharing and
automated analysis technologies have become part of official
government information technology development policy." 167 A May
2004 report by the General Accounting Office revealed the extent that
the federal government uses data mining in their operations. 168 The
report indicates that 52 out of 128 federal agencies, nearly forty
percent, participate in some level of government data mining.
Among these 52 agencies, there are a total of 199 data mining
programs, with 131 of these in progress and 68 planned. 170  The
164 Taipale, supra note 152, at 5.
165 Robert Pear, Panel Urges New Protection on Federal 'Data Mining, 'N.Y.TIMES, May 17,
2004, at A12.
166 Id.; see Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681.
167 Taipale, supra note 152, at 2.
168 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148.
169 Id. at 2; Claburn, supra note 161.
170 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 3; Clabum, supra note 161.
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Department of Defense currently uses 47 data mining projects,
employing the largest number of projects. 17 1 Out of the 199 projects
being used, 77 of them have participated in data sharing. 172 They use
data obtained from other federal agencies, as opposed to data original
to that agency or obtained from a private entity. Additionally, 122 of
the programs used personal information, such as phone numbers,
social security numbers, email addresses, and driver's license
numbers. 173 The potential for future data mining is exponential. There
are currently over 2,000 databases within federal agencies and
departments. Many of these could be subject to data mining within
that agency or shared with other agencies for the purpose of data
mining.
D. CHALLENGES REGARDING GOVERNMENT DATA MINING
When the government mines data, great amounts of useful
information may be found. There are, however, significant challenges
that are faced when participating in this process. First, there are
concerns over the quality and accuracy of the data being mined.
175
Accurate information is vital to producing useful results. Without
current and accurate information more mistakes will arise, such as
mistaken identity and the misinterpretation of information leading to
faulty inferences. The quality of the data may be especially dependent
upon the source of the data. Information gathered by the private sector
then obtained by the government is the most likely set of data to be
inaccurate. 176 For example, it is more likely that one would report a
false address when registering at a hotel than when that person is
obtaining his or her driver's license from the government. It is
171 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 3; See Kim Zetter, GAO: Fed Data
Mining Extensive (May 2, 2004), at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/
0,1848,63623,00.htrnl?tw=wn storyrelated; Pear, supra note 165, at 12.
172 SOURCEWATCH, supra note 150.
173 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 10; See Pear, supra note 165, at 12.
174 Tien, supra note 158, at 389.
175 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 6; Seifert, supra note 160, at 11.
176 James X. Dempsey, The Defense of Privacy Act and Privacy in the Hands of The
Government, Statement before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law and Subcommittee on the Constitution (July 22, 2003),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/HearingTestimony.aspx?ID=150.
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suggested that "data cleansing" is a key requirement "to achieving
useful results.' 77 Data cleansing requires the information to be sorted
through and checked for accuracy. This can be a daunting task
considering that vast amounts of data are available.' 
78
Some argue, however, that the government's reliance on the
information produced through data mining should be curbed, unless
there are data quality or reliability standards in place. 79 Without these
standards, the information should not be used to generate probable
cause, and should be limited to finding data quickly if there is already
particularized suspicion concerning an individual.1 Additionally, the
quality of the information may depend on the skill of the analyst.'
8 1
Data mining systems are complex and require a highly trained analyst
to bring value to the information produced. If the skill of the analyst is
lacking, then the quality of the information produced could be lacking
as well.
Third, there is a concern that the lack of procedural, judicial, and
congressional constraints on data mining results in increased privacy
violations. There are currently a limited number of judicial or
procedural limits placed on both commercial and government
programs. 182 It is argued that without limits, the security of the data
can be easily compromised. 183 For example, there may be intentional
abuses by government employees that have access to the data, even
though their access is not necessary for the effectiveness of the
177 Taipale, supra note 152, at 7.
178 Letter from U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy to The Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General
2 (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/O1/leahyO 1003.html.
179 James X. Dempsey & Paul Rosenzweig, Technologies that Can Protect Privacy as
Information is Shared to Combat Terrorism, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY 4
(May 26, 2004), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/
20040526technologies.pdf.
180 Id. at 5; Taipale, supra note 152, at 18.
181 Seifert, supra note 160, at 11.
182 Ramasastry, supra note 151.
183 Gregory D. Kutz, Data Mining: Results and Challenges for Government Program Audits
and Investigations, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee.on Government Reform, House of
Representatives, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTInG OFFICE, GAO-03-591T (Mar. 25, 2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03591t.pdf.
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process. 184 In the commercial sector, the security of a ChoicePoint
database was compromised, allowing for the identity theft of 145,000
individuals across the United States.' 85  Judicial and procedural
constraints could help answer questions such as: Who can access data?
What kind of data can and will be compiled? How will data sharing be
enforced? How do we guarantee that those who do not have access
will not be able to access the data? 86  Rules that govern how
technology operates, rather than the type of technology used and
developed, can be used to establish privacy standards.' 
87
Fourth, there is a general concern regarding the use of data for
purposes other than that for which it was originally collected. 188 When
data is shared and mined or mined for various reasons by the collector,
the information is being used in a way that may not have been
anticipated by the holder of the information when the information was
given. For example, there is concern that data will be gathered and
used in the name of fightinr terrorism but will actually be used for
general law enforcement. 1w Some privacy advocates and civil
libertarians believe that consent should be required before information
can be used for a purpose other than that for which it was gathered.
Others would agree that rules allowing an individual to know about the
"collection of their personal information, how to access that
information, and how to request a correction of inaccurate
information" should be considered by lawmakers.190 Such rules would
require a balance between citizen consent and maintaining the
usefulness of the program.
Fifth, numerous Fourth Amendment issues arise through the use of
data mining. The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment "is to
safeguard the privacy and securit of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials.' 191 Although many may think of
184 Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 179, at 4.
185 Bob Sullivan, Data Theft Affects 145,000 Nationwide, MSNBC (Feb. 18, 2005), available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6979897/.
186 Ramasastry, supra note 151.
187 Taipale, supra note 152, at 3.
188 Seifert, supra note 160, at 12.
189 Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 179, at 5.
190 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 6.
191 Tien, supra note 158, at 400.
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this principle applying to law enforcement specifically, there is no
categorical exclusion of other government officials. This implies that
a violation of privacy by an official in the Department of the Interior
would invoke Fourth Amendment protection.
Two constitutional privacy concerns arise from data mining. First,
the core of the privacy complaint is that data is being linked." If the
information was initially given voluntarily, then a privacy violation is
doubtful. However, by linking this voluntary information, one can
determine previously unknown information that would have required
consent to obtain if it were obtained without the data mining process.
Also, associational privacy may be violated. 193 Data mining searches
patterns and determines a person's relationships and behaviors, so that
it can determine associations. A typical example is the use of data
mining to determine an individual's association to a terrorist
organization.
The Fourth Amendment does not apply unless the data mining is
considered a search. 194 In order for an activity to be a search, the
individual must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 19 There are
several arguments both identifying data mining as a search or not as a
search. Those that argue that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in these documents, and that data mining therefore is not a
search, base their argument on the fact that the information is
knowingly exposed. The information was knowingly exposed to the
public when the individual released it, and knowingly exposed
information has no reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the
data mining is not a search.
196
Alternatively, those believing data mining is a search argue that the
mere fact that the information has been exposed does not make the
Fourth Amendment irrelevant. 197  They argue that although the
original information was knowingly exposed, the patterns and
behaviors that are discovered were not, and the individual holds an
expectation of privacy concerning them. Those advocating for Fourth
'92 Id. at 398.
193 Id. at 399.
'94Id. at 408.
19 5 Id.
196 Tien, supra note 158, at 408.
'97 ld. at 393.
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Amendment protections in data mining believe that federal agencies
should obtain court approval before engaging in data mining,
especially data mining that deals with personally identifiable
information. 198 This court approval would be based on particularized
suspicion. 199 Basing the data mining on particularized suspicion
would limit inquiries concerning an individual, unless there was
already existing suspicion as to illegal activities. The court approval
would also be based on particularized scope. For example, the
generalized "fishing expeditions" that are used by many data mining
programs would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
20 0
II: FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GOVERNMENT DATA MINING
Federal agencies are the primary users of public sector data mining
initiatives. During 2003, significant dilemmas in data mining were
placed in the public eye and the government was forced to balance the
privacy interests against the necessity and usefulness of certain data
mining programs. One program that did not withstand this balancing
test was the Total Information Awareness Program, which received a
funding cut in September 2003. This program, along with the 2004
report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States (9/11 Commission) encouraged Congress to look at how
the intelligence community shares and utilizes information, which
resulted in the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. The following section looks at these
developments along with other data mining initiatives that developed
in 2004.
A. TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM
The Total Information Awareness Program (TIA) was one of the
most publicized and controversial data mining projects conducted by
the United States government in recent years. This use of technology
and research generated much criticism, and ultimately funding for the
program was eliminated by Congress. Parts of the program continue
in various forms, however.
... Id. at 402.
199 Id.
'0o Id. at 405.
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i. TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The TIA was developed as a project of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency under the direction of John Poindexter, who
was appointed head of the Information Awareness Office to lead this
proj ect. 20 The TIA was designed to 2agregate and analyze
information from a wide array of databases.a The program would
then create a baseline pattern identifying suspicious behavior and mine
the data based on that pattern.2 °3  Poindexter expressed that the
purpose of the TIA was solely for research and development of the
technology and to create a prototype, not for implementation. 20 4 Three
areas were identified as technologies to be developed through the TIA:
language translation capacity, data search with pattern recognition and
privacy protection, and advanced collaborative and decision support
tools.2a 5  Congress would be responsible for determining whether it
violatedorivacy rights, and the extent to which the technology would
be used.
The development of the TIA was spurred by the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. The theory behind its development was that
possible terrorist threats could be identified by sorting through
everyday transactions, such as credit card purchases, car rentals, and
travel reservations. 0 7 The development of the TIA technology was to
be used to produce watch lists, profiles, and to mark certain
201 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, DATA MINING (Jan. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=9718&print=yes&units=all; Interview by
Robert O'Harrow with John Poindexter, Head of the Total Information Awareness Program,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (2004), available at
http://www.noplacetohide.net/poindexter.html.
202 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
203 Sharon R. Anderson, Total Information Awareness and Beyond: The Dangers of Using
Data Mining Technology to Prevent Terrorism, BILL OF RIGHTS DEFENSE COMMITTEE,
available at http://www.bordc.org/data-mining.pdf; Taipale, supra note 152, at 11.
204 Paul Rosenzweig, Proposals for Implementing the Terrorism Information Awareness
System, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/HomelandDefense/lm8.cfm.
205 Seifert, supra note 160, at 5.
206 Interview by Robert O'Harrow with John Poindexter, supra note 201.
207 Id.
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individuals as suspicious. 20 8 This was in an effort to prevent future
terrorist attacks, primarily by analyzing patterns of activity, rather than
individual activity.2 0
9
ii. CRITIQUE OF THE TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM
Many of the concerns of data mining in general have been
expressed toward the TIA, but with greater specificity. Privacy
advocates felt that the TIA presented an "enormous invasion of
privacy., 210 Even the Department of Defense Inspector General stated
that the program failed to meet privacy concerns. l There was a sense
that the data mining was delving into areas of information that pushed
the envelope of Fourth Amendment protections. "Data mining, like
any other government data analysis, should occur where there is a
focused and demonstrable need to know, balanced against the dangers
to civil liberties. It should be purposeful and responsible. 2 2  Some
believe that the TIA constituted domestic spying and was intended
solely for surveillance of Americans. 213 This became the fear of many
Americans based on the name, the logo which resembled an
omnipotent, watchful eye, and the motto that "knowledge is power."214
There was apprehension that the government, through the TIA, was
becoming a big brother and had catalogues of information about the
private lives of all citizens. 21
5
A Fourth Amendment debate over the program ensued over what
level of suspicion was currently required and should be required to
208 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
209 Associated Press, supra note 156; Rosenzweig, supra note 204.
210 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
211 Id.
212 Letter from U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy to The Honorable John Ashcroft, supra note 178.
213 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Poindexter's Recent Op-Ed Reflects
Inconsistencies in Statements Regarding Total Information Awareness (TIA) (2004) available
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/TIAinconsistencies.html.
214 Seifert, supra note 160, at 7.
215 American Civil Liberties Union, Stop the Government Plan to Mine Our Privacy with
"Total Information Awareness " System (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/
Privacy.cfm?ID=1 1323&c=130; Rosenzweig, supra note 204.
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justify the mining of personal information. There was an argument
that the program worked backwards and would make all citizens
suspects of terrorist activity without proof of any wrongdoing.
216
Rather than being used to generate probable cause, the TIA should
only be employed after probable cause has already been generated.
217
Accessing sensitive data to determine if someone could be a terrorist
without any probable cause is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 21
8
Another argument against the TIA's violation of the Fourth
Amendment was based on search warrants. These arguments assumed
that individuals had an expectation of privacy with regard to their data,
and therefore TIA data mining constituted a search. However, there
was no probable cause, particularized suspicion, or warrant obtained
so the searches were unreasonable and did not comply with the Fourth
Amendment. 2 19 The only way that the warrantless search could fall
within the Fourth Amendment would be if it fit within one of the
exceptions of incident to arrest, exigent circumstances, or consent.
220
Most cases do not fit under these categories and therefore, it is argued,
would be unreasonable and a violation of privacy rights. Regardless of
the theory used to determine an intrusion on Fourth Amendment
privacy rights, it was generally agreed that the TIA did not fully
protect the privacy of American citizens.
An additional critique of the program was its lack of safeguards.
With the enormous size of the database and the wealth of information
that could be gathered from the system, the safeguards put in place
were inadequate. 22' Arguments were made to Congress that the TIA
database was a prime target for "exploitation and attack by malicious
computer users.' 222 Not only was the database subject to outside
216 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 215.
217 Associated Press, Give It Up: Info for Protection, WIRED.COM (May, 2, 2004), available at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,633 04,00.html?tw=wn story related.
218 Ramasastry, supra note 151.
219 Max Blumenthal, Data Debase, PROSPECT.ORG (Dec. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2003/12/blumenthal-m- 12-19.html; Anderson, supra
note 203, at 12.
220 Anderson, supra note 203, at 13.
221 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
222 Letter from the Association for Computing Machinery's U.S. Public Policy Committee to
Senators John Warner & Carl Levin 1 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.acm.org/
usacm/Letters/tia final.html.
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attackers, but also to abuse by internal users. Thousands of users had
and thousands more would have access to this system, which would
make security difficult and the potential for extortion high.223 These
lack of safeguards could lead to data being exploited, therefore
resulting in even further invasions of privacy than what the TIA was
already accused of.
2 2 4
As with data mining in general, many perceived the TIA as an
inaccurate source of information. There may be difficulties in
continually having updated or accurate information considering that
the database has input from a variety of sources.225 This could result
in a high number of false positives, causing innocent people to be
placed on watch lists or preventing them from obtaining certain
jobs.226 Another factor that may dilute the effectiveness of the
program is acclimation. The targets, such as potential terrorists, will
quickly learn the parameters and patterns being used to identify them
and quickly change their habits.227  Without skilled analysts and
technology support staff to make updates to the program continuously,
it could quickly become outdated and ineffective.
iii. MORATORIUM ON THE TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM
If the TIA were completed, it would have been the largest domestic
1 228surveillance system in the United States. However, the
overwhelming concerns with the program prompted Congress to place
a moratorium on funding for the program in September 2003. This
moratorium was part of a FY2004 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act.229 It stated that there would be no further
223 Id.; Declan McCullagh, TIA Proponents Defend Domestic Spy Plan, CNET (Apr. 2, 2003),
available at http://news.com.com/TIA+proponents+defend+domestic+spy_plan/2100-1029_3-
995229.html?tag=nl.
224 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
225 Id.
226 Letter from U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy to The Honorable John Ashcroft, supra note 178;
Associated Press, supra note 156; PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
227 Anderson, supra note 203, at 12.
228 Blumenthal, supra note 219.
229 Seifert, supra note 160, at 7; Data Mining Moratorium Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-87.
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appropriations to the TIA or other similar programs. 23  The two
primary reasons that Congress suspended funding were that (1) there
was no evidence that data mining was an effective tool for preventing
terrorism and (2) privacy rights could be adversely affected because
private information was mined.2 3 1 The Act also required a report on
the current state of data mining to be delivered to Congress. 232 This
report was generated and delivered in the form of the GAO 2004
report. 2
33
iv. THE FUTURE OF THE TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM
OR SIMILAR PROGRAMS
The future of the TIA is uncertain. It is clear that Congress will
not support funding for the TIA in its current state. However, various
groups have suggested improvements to the TIA that may make it
useful while alleviating privacy invasion concerns. The Heritage
Foundation has suggested the following safeguards that may achieve
these goals: 2
34
• Congressional authorization for data mining.
* Built-in limitations on access to third party data. For
example, a subpoena could be required to search credit
card or bank records.
* Patterns to identify terrorists to be approved by a Senate-
appointed official before the search is conducted.
* Individual information to be disaggregated from pattern
analysis.
230 The Data-Mining Moratorium Act of 2003 (Jan. 16, 2003),
http://www.techlawjoumal.com/cong108/datamining/20030116.asp.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148.
234 Rosenzweig, supra note 204.
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* Individual identities not to be disclosed without approval
from a federal judge.
* Data mining leading only to further investigation, not
arrest or a no fly list.
* Implement a system to correct mistakes and false
235positives.
* Additional accountability and oversight by other
government branches.
* Restriction that TIA can only be used for terrorism
investigations.
" Allow for tort remedies or administrative hearings for
individuals harmed due to wrongful identification.236
Despite the moratorium ending all funding, certain research and
development aspects of the TIA have continued under other programs
and agencies. Essentially some of the technology that was being
developed under the name of the TIA was transferred to other
intelligence offices to continue to be developed.237  For example, the
voice recognition software that the TIA began constructing has been
moved to the research and development office at the Pentagon.238
Another project that has continued is the creation of translation
software that mines data through spoken archives.
239
Although the moratorium restricted funding for programs similar
to the TIA, several have remained. One of the most prominent is the
National Foreign Intelligence Program. 240 This program is a joint
235 See also id.
236 See also id.
237 Associated Press, supra note 156.
238 SOURCEWATCH, Total Information Awareness (2004), available at
http://www.sourcewatch.org/wiki.phtmil?title=TotalInformationAwareness.
239 Blumenthal, supra note 219.
240 Associated Press, supra note 156; CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, Fact Sheet:
Data Mining Programs and Other Government Uses of Commercial Data (Oct. 16, 2003),
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/031016factsheet.shtm.
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collaboration between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security
Agency. 241 It does not invoke the privacy issues that the TIA did,
because it can only be used overseas or against non-U.S. citizens in the
United States. It cannot be used against Americans on American
soil.242 This is the primary difference between this permitted data
mining program and the stricken TIA. Another similar program that
did not receive a funding cut is a project of the Advanced Research
and Development Activity. 24  This $64 million project has similar
data mining feature to that of the TIA, and even uses former TIA
researchers and analysts.
244
With the news that a number of TIA projects are continuing in
various departments, privacy advocates worry that TIA projects that
the public does not know about are continuing to be developed.245
Essentially, the structure of the TIA may be dissolved, but the
components that presented privacy issues are still vibrant. To combat
the implementation of these programs, several suggestions have been
made. First, privacy impact assessments should be made for eachgovernment data mining project.246 These PIAs could be conducted
before research and development begins, at the prototype stage, and
immediately prior to implementation. Another suggestion would be to
have a Privacy Ombudsman oversee the development and
implementation of government data mining projects.247
B. INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
In December 2004, Congress passed and the President signed into
law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA). The purpose of this act is "to assist in connecting the dots of
241 Blumenthal, supra note 219.
242 Interview by Robert O'Harrow with John Poindexter, supra note 201.
243 Associated Press, supra note 156.
244 id.
245 Blumenthal, supra note 219; Anderson, supra note 203, at 4.
246 Ramasastry, supra note 151.
247 Id.
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intelligence information" particularly in regard to terrorist activity.248
The text of the bill makes clear that information sharing will be
encouraged among the intelligence community. Many
Congresspersons suggested similar bills that would require uniform
intelligence sharing and the creation of a centralized director of
intelligence. For example, the Shield Privacy Act was proposed in
May 2004 and would create a Privacy Czar in the Office of
Management and Budget. 249 However, the ideas that won the vote of
both Houses and the President came in the summer of 2004 from the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission).250 This commission criticized the intelligence
community for its fragmented management structure and inability to
"connect the dots" to pre-empt terrorist strikes.251 The act consists of
various provisions such as increased transportation and border security
and terrorism prevention mechanisms; 2 5  however, this article will
only focus on the parts that may affect data mining and how privacy
may be affected by the new act.
i. CREATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
One of the most dramatic changes made by the IRTPA was the
addition of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The purpose of
the DNI varies depending on the source, but Senator Bob Graham
endorsed the bill by stating that, "the intelligence community needs a
leader with the clout to set common goals, establish priorities, knock
heads, and ensure that the American people are protected. 25 3 There is
248 Rosenzweig, supra note 204.
249 Kim Zetter, US. May Get a Privacy Czar, WIRED.COM (May 21, 2004), at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,63542,00.html?tw=wn story-related.
250 Todd B. Tatelman, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National
Standards for Drivers 'Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
crs/RL32722.pdf.
251 Alfred Cumming, The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (Aug. 12, 2004) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
crs/RL32506.pdf.
252 U.S. EMBASSY OF CANADA, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(2005), available at http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/can-usa/
borderissuesirtpa2004.pdf.
253 Cumming, supra note 251, at 14.
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general agreement that the DNI will create one entity throuh which
intelligence budget, personnel, and information will flow. Other
stated purposes have been to ensure privacy protections are not eroded
by intelligence technologies, to coordinate all intelligence efforts of
the federal government, and to lighten the burden of the Director of
Central Intelligence.
255
Congress has made at least fourteen attempts to create a Director
of National Intelligence or similar position.25 6 Between June 2002 and
June 2004, at least six bills were introduced in the Senate in an attempt
to create the position.257 In 2002, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced
a proposal that was rejected, but its revised version, which gave the
DNI budget and personnel responsibilities, finally became theIRTPA.2 8
Below is a list of intelligence and privacy related responsibilities
that will be taken on by the DNI.
• Report directly to the President and provide daily
briefings to the President about intelligence
developments.259
" Establish objectives and priorities for the intelligence
community.260 Privacy advocates are pushing for one of
these objectives to be a protection of individual privacy
rights.
" Determine and execute a budget for the National
Intelligence Program and has the ability to transfer funds
254 Id. at 5.
25 5 Id. at 13.
256 Id. at 16-19.
257 Id. at 4, 5.
258 Cumming, supra note 251, at 4.
259 U.S. EMBASSY OF CANADA, supra note 252, at 2; UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION
ACT OF 2004 (Dec. 6,2004), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/
ConferenceReportSummary.doc.
260 UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 259.
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among intelligence agencies to accomplish necessary
purposes.26' The DNI would be able to monitor
compliance if agencies were required to submit privacy
impact assessments or other privacy checks before
receiving funding for data mining projects.
Monitor heads of intelligence centers and agencies and
has the authority to make personnel changes.
Ensure quality of the intelligence being generated.262
This will be an area where the DNI will constantly be
required to balance the quality of the intelligence with
potential privacy invasions. The DNI will have a Civil
Liberties Protection Officer to counteract the urge to
obtain the best quality, regardless of Fourth Amendment
protections.263
ii. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES BoARD
The drafters of the bill recognized that increased intelligence
sharing would increase privacy concerns. Therefore, the IRTPA
created a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. The purpose of the Board
is "to ensure that privacy and civil liberties concerns are appropriately
considered in the implementation of laws, regulations, and executive
branch policies related to efforts to protect the nation against
terrorism. ' '264 For example, the Board will review the techniques used
for the individual tracking systems used by border and immigration
patrol, and the database used to track security clearances, both of
which were authorized under IRTPA.265
This Board is responsible for reviewing policies and procedures in
conjunction with the Privacy Office of the Department of Homeland
Security and will be located in the Executive Office of the President.
266
261 Id.
262 Cumming, supra note 251.
263 UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 259.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.; U.S. EMBASSY OF CANADA, supra note 252.
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The Board will review a procedure put in place by the IRTPA that
requires agencies to expend funds to ensure the security of
information, as soon as a data technology project begins.267 The Board
is also charged with working with the President to create an
Information Sharing Environment. 268 The President must create an
Information Sharing Environment to "facilitate the sharing of terrorism
information among all appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, and
private sector entities, through the use of policy guidelines and
technology. '" 269 The Board will be involved in this development to
ensure that the Information Sharing Environment does not become an
arching government surveillance tool or reach into the private space of
U.S. citizens.
iii. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS
Another implemented recommendation of the 9/11 Commission
was the institution of national identification standards. 270 Before the
IRTPA, all identification, such as driver's licenses and personal
identification cards, were at the sole discretion of the states.71 The
IRTPA does not take away the power to issue identification from
states, but rather creates standards that states must meet, and gives the
Secretary of Transportation the authority to make federal standards.272
These standards may include what information must be on the
identification cards and the documentation required to obtain the card.
Privacy advocates fear that these standards will place higher
burdens on states to deal with privacy concerns. State systems may
not have the level of security necessary to protect this data, which may
increase the chances of identity theft and misuse of private
information. These increased expectations may be overwhelming for
state and local governments trying to balance the demand for efficient
26 7 UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 259.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Tatelman, supra note 250.
271 Id. at 1.
272 id.
[Vol. 1:2-3
KAWAKAMI & MCCARTY
technology uses and expectations of privacy.273  Privacy advocates
also fear that these standards are the first step toward a national
identification system, which could create a climate of excessive
government surveillance.
274
iv. IMPACT AND CRITIQUE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND
TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
Since the passage of the IRTPA, many policy analysts have
critiqued and discussed the impact of the IRTPA. Some praise the
IRTPA for creating privacy and oversight protections for information
sharing, while others argue that there are not sufficient safeguards in
place to prevent an abuse of intelligence information.2 /3 Most
appreciate that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board will be helpful to
ensure that privacy concerns are considered when drafting policy.
2 76
There are concerns that this Board will be too politically motivated
and lack independence, because the positions are Presidentially
appointed. 27' Privacy advocates are concerned that the IRTPA is "too
lax on limits on domestic spying., 278 The Act lowers standards for the
FBI to conduct secret surveillance. 279 This lowering of the standard
seems contrary to the purposes of some of the privacy safeguards in
the IRTPA, like the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. Similarly,
273 National Electronic Commerce Coordinating Council, Enterprise Identity and Access
Management: The Rights and Wrongs of Process, Privacy and Technology 2 (Nov. 2003)
available at http://www.ec3.org/Downloads/2003/EnterpriseIdentity.pdf.
274 Susan Llewelyn Leach, A Driver's License as National ID?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(Jan. 24, 2005) available at http://www.christiansciencemonitor.com/2005/0124/p 11 s02-
ussc.html.
275 Reclaim Democracy, Evaluating the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Dec. 27, 2004), at http://reclaimdemocracy.org/articles_2004/
evaluation_2004intelligencereform.html; Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to
Congress (Dec. 6, 2004) available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID= 17154&c=206.
276 Reclaim Democracy, supra note 275.
277 Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to Congress, supra note 275.
278 Id.
279 Reclaim Democracy, supra note 275.
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there is a concern that the Information Sharing Environment could
become a tool for data surveillance without boundaries. 28 0
C. OTHER GOVERNMENT DATA MINING INITIATIVES
A variety of other data mining initiatives have arisen recently
through government agencies. The Department of Homeland Security
was authorized in its creation under the Homeland Security Act to
participate in data mining. 28 This authorization will certainly result in
a number of projects to further the Department's anti-terrorism
purposes. One such project is Incident Data Mart, which will
assemble data from any federal, state, or local law enforcement log to
"spot possible terrorist activities." 282 Privacy advocates will continue
to monitor these activities to ensure Fourth Amendment protections
are incorporated into their development.
Domestic law enforcement entities are increasingly using data
mining. Recent focus has been put on developing and implementing
the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. This is a plan
designed under the presumption that "no single government agency -
or government - can win the war on terrorism." The purpose of the
plan is to ensure that the law enforcement community is effectively
sharing information. 284 This plan consists of a variety of initiatives
that focus on different types and uses of information. Current
initiatives include the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative,
Law Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative, Criminal Intelligence
Coordinating Council, Criminal Justice Information Systems Division,
as well as cooperation with the FBI.285 This plan has been developed
280 Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to Congress, supra note 275.
281 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 240.
282 Declan McCullagh, Government Data-mining Lives On, NEWS.COM (June 1, 2004),
available at http://news.com.com/Government+data-mining+lives+on/2010-1028_3-
5223088.html.
283 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fact Sheet: National Criminal Intelligence Sharing
Plan (May 14, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/05/doj051404.html.
285 id.
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for the federal justice constituency, but can be adapted to fit other sizes
and types of programs in need of an information sharing directive.
286
The FBI has found use in data mining and employs it through
several programs. It believes that the "sharing of intelligence [is]
absolutely critical to prevention efforts." 287 One of the most recent
programs is the National Intel Share Project.2 88  The most current
efforts are focused on gathering data from all FBI computers into a
single, searchable data warehouse. Varying levels of sophistication in
data mining are also being used by the Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Foreign Terrorist
Tracking Task Force, and the Office of Law Enforcement
Coordination. 289 Another criminal justice data mining project is the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which links all levels of law
enforcement and financial communities. 290  As these programs are
implemented and become more prevalent, they will need to be
evaluated for privacy protection.
III. STATE DEVELOPMENTS IN GOVERNMENT DATA MINING:
MULTISTATE ANTI-TERRORISM INFORMATION EXCHANGE (MATRIX)
The federal government is not the only entity taking advantage of
the benefits of data mining. State governments are implementing data
mining techniques to further process improvements, law enforcement,
and various other purposes served by analyzing large quantities of
data. In the wake of September 11, 2001, states realized that they
needed to play a role in fighting terrorism. The MATRIX program
was designed specifically for this reason. As with the TIA, the
MATRIX program has been subject to much criticism and decreased
participation.
286 GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE/STANDARDS WORKING GROUP, A FRAMEWORK FOR JUSTICE
INFORMATION SHARING: SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE (SOA) 5 (Dec. 9, 2004), available
at http://it.ojp.gov/process-links.jsp?linkid=4418.
287 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PARTNERSHIPS (2004), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterrorism/partnership.htm.
288 Id.
2 91 Id.; Robert A. Martin, The Joint Terrorism Task Force: A Concept That Works, Anti-
Defamation League (2004), available at http://www.adl.org/leam/jttf/default.asp.
290 SOURCEWATCH, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2005), at
http://www.sourcewatch.org/wiki.phtm?title=Financial-Crimes-Enforcement-Network.
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A. MATRIX OVERVIEW
The MATRIX program was originally designed by Hank Asher of
Seisint, Inc., for the state of Florida.29 1 Seisint, a private database
contractor, still operates the program which mines a large amount of
information including: marriage and divorce data, criminal history
records, names and addresses of family and neighbors, names and
addresses of business associates, driver's license data, vehicle
registration records, incarceration records, and digital photos.292 The
purpose of gathering this information is "to assist in investigations
pertaining to threats to national security."293 This centralized database
pulls together local, state, and federal law enforcement data and
intelligence, along with public databases from agencies like the
department of motor vehicle and property records. 294 This information
can then be searched according to a specific subject or through pattern
analysis.
The program has a variety of uses for state law enforcement
officials. Like other data mining programs, data is cross-linked to
other data using information technology expertise, public and private
data sets, and a supercomputer. 295 The software can run pattern-based
inquiries to create watch lists and determine possible terrorism
suspects. 296  State governments and Seisint claim this is not datamining, despite the scrutiny that it is more than just gathering data.2 97
291 Interview by Robert O'Harrow with Hank Asher, Founder of Seisint (2004), available at
http://www.noplacetohide.net/asher.html.
292 SOURCEWATCH, Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange Program (2005), at
http://www.sourcewatch.org/wiki.phtml?title=MultistateAnti-
TerrorismInformationExchangeProgram.
293 Letter from Marshal Home, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety
to Jim Lientz, Chief Operating Officer, State of Georgia Office of the Governor 1 (Sept. 29,
2003), available at www.dmvs.ga.gov; see also http://www.matrix-at.org/.
294 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
295 Blumenthal, supra note 219.
296 Anderson, supra note 203, at 6; PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supra note 201.
297 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Unveils Disturbing New
Revelations About MATRIX Surveillance Program (May 20, 2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfim?ID=- 5834&c= 130.
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They claim that it is "factual data analysis. 298 One specific function
that MATRIX hallmarked was the High Terrorist Factor. This
quotient was used "to measure the likelihood that individuals in the
company's databases were terrorists., 299 After searching its records,
based on this quotient, the database returned 120,000 people with high
terrorist factors. After only approximately 40 of these led to arrests,
the quotient was no longer used. 30
The MATRIX program was designed for the use of state
governments, rather than the federal government. Florida originated
the program, with the backing of Governor Jeb Bush.301  At least
fifteen states had committed to the program by the beginning of 2003;
however, various problems arising with the program, as discussed
below, caused many states to cease their participation. Texas
withdrew in May 2003 and California followed by withdrawing in
June 2003.302 As of July 25, 2003, thirteen states were committed to
the MATRIX program. Over the next year, eight more states would
cease participation, leaving only five states participating as of May
2004. These states included Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania. 304  In August 2004, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and former Governor William Milliken filed suit
against the State of Michigan, contending that the state police's
participation in the MATRIX program was a violation of the state's
Interstate Law Enforcement Intelligence Organization's Act of
298 Id. at 4; see also American Civil Liberties Union, MATRIX: Myths and Reality 2 ACLU
PRIVACY & TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/
Privacy.cfn?ID=14894&c=130.
299 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 297, at 2.
300 Tien, supra note 158, at 5.
301 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 297, at 1.
302 Letter from Marshall Caskey, TX Chief Criminal Law Enforcement to Tim Moore, Chair
of Project MATRIX, Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement (May 21, 2003); Letter from Jim T.
Moore, Commissioner, Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement to Patrick Lunney, Director for CA
Dept. of Justice (June 12, 2003).
303 Letter from Andrew T. Mitchell, Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness to Emory
Williams, Institute for Intergovernmental Research (July 25, 2003); Seisint, MA TRIX: First
Responder Support (Jan. 24, 2003), available at www.seisint.com.
304 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148, at 5.
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1980.305 The ACLU and former governor contend that the law
requires participation in such a program to be implemented only. by the
approval of the state legislature or with a citizen oversight body, in
order to "prevent unsupervised and uncontrolled access to information
about individuals." 30 6 Currently, Michigan is still a member of the
MATRIX program.
B. CRITIQUES OF THE MATRIX PROGRAM
Privacy advocates fear that MATRIX is a scaled down version of
the TIA.3°7 Opponents of the program believe that the same data
mining techniques that would have been used in the TIA to provide
Pentagon anti-terrorism experts with information can now be
disseminated to any local law enforcement official.30 8 The difference
in levels of authority could also lead to differences in the level of
information security. The ability for information abuse appears higher
because of the lower level of expertise and training of the end users.
Others believe that MATRIX is a scaled down TIA program
because of the source of its funding. Although states are required to
pay for the program, it is primarily supported through $8 million from
the Department of Homeland Security and $4 million from the Justice
Department.30 9 It is argued that the federal departments are funding
this Rrogram in an effort to make it nationwide, thereby replacing the
TIA. This is supported by the fact that the Department of Homeland
Security requires managerial oversight and control, and enters into a
"Cooperative Agreement" rather than a grant as a prerequisite for
305 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Michigan and Former Governor
Charge State Police with Violating Data Collection Law Through Controversial MATRIX
Database Program (Aug. 3, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/
Privacy.cfn?ID=16206&c=l 30.
306 id.
307 Blumenthal, supra note 219.
308 Id.
309 Anderson, supra note 203, at 6; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 297, at 4;
Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and The Matrix, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 27, 2004) available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57156-2004May26.html.
310 Blumenthal, supra note 219.
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dispensing the $8 million.311 This arrangement has come into question
and the ACLU has asked Nuala O'Connor Kelly, the Department of
Homeland Security Privacy Officer, to investigate the Department of
Homeland Security's involvement in the state data mining MATRIX
project. 312
Not only do privacy advocates have problems with the MATRIX
program, many states do as well. The recent decline in the number of
participants indicates that the program is not the ideal centralized
database system for the majority of states. First, state governments
generally operate on tight budgets and the funding required from each
state is not feasible. 313 Each state must pay an annual charge of $1.78
million to participate in the program, as well as commit sufficient
personnel and training dollars to allow the program to run
successfully. 314  Second, states already find it difficult to obtain
information from its citizens for needed services. Many citizens refuse
to provide digital signatures, fingerrints, or social security numbers
when getting their driver's licenses. If these individuals knew that
the information would then become part of a large database for the
government to learn more about them and investigate them for
possible wrongdoing, many more would not give the requested
information or would give false information. This would then lead to
results based on inaccurate or missing data. Fourth, states are
concerned about giving public data to a non-public entity, Seisint.
States that have chosen not to participate believe that there are "legal,
ethical, and financial considerations in providing non-public data sets
at [the state's] expense to a private company to sell back to [the
state]."316  The use of only one company essentially creates a
311 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Unveils Disturbing New
Revelations About MATRIX Surveillance Program (May 20, 2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfin?ID=15834&c=130; see also American Civil
Liberties Union, supra note 297, at 4; Steinhardt, supra note 309.
312 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 311.
313 Letter from Marshall Caskey, Texas Chief Criminal Law Enforcement to Tim Moore,
Chair of Project MATRIX, Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement, supra note 302, at 1.
314 Letter from Marshal Home, Commisioner, Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety to
Jim Lientz, Chief Operating Officer, State of Georgia Office of the Governor, supra 293, at 2.
3 15 id.
316 Letter from Marshall Caskey, TX Chief Criminal Law Enforcement to Tim Moore, Chair
of Project MATRIX, Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement, supra note 302, at 2.
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monopoly for Seisint, because it controls the database and the data.
The system is likely not compatible with other systems and would be
difficult, if not impossible, to transfer. Therefore, a state using the
MATRIX program would have to continue to use Seisint, thereby
creating a monopoly in violation of public policy.
317
Most of the concerns with data mining generally apply to the
MATRIX program, like lack of safeguards inaccurate data collection,
and no procedures for ensuring accuracy. 3 18 The Fourth Amendment
issues continue to arise with arguments that the systems should only be
used after probable cause is generated, in order to avoid treating all
Americans as suspects to be eliminated. 19 There is even greater
concern at the state level that MATRIX is being promoted to the
public as an anti-terrorism tool, but will actually be used as a general
law enforcement tool.320 This perception may be greater at the state
level because citizens are more likely to view terrorism as a national
problem and do not see the states playing a large role in terrorism
prevention. A more specific concern is the possibility of the program
discriminating against certain ethnic groups based on the patterns that
are searched. For example, it is likely that Middle Eastern men will be
targeted based on the search methods of the MATRIX. This was
especially hazardous when the High Terrorism Factor index was
used.321
IV. CONTROVERSIES IN GOVERNMENT DATA MINING
It is agreed that technology is useful, but needs to be designed in a
way to protect privacy. 322 There must be methods to limit or restrict
data mining to protect privacy, while maintaining or enhancing the
technology's usefulness. Ways to achieve this balance have been the
topic of much academic and professional research. While this balance
is being sought, there will be legal disputes about its constitutionality
and its misuse.
317 Steinhardt, supra note 309.
318 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 305.
319 Associated Press, supra note 217; Steinhardt, supra note 309.
320 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 298.
321 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 297, at 2.
322 Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 179, at 1; Rosenzweig, supra note 204.
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A. OBTAINING BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND
USEFUL DATA MINING
A variety of suggestions have been made to improve data mining
technology. The recommendations vary in degree of severity. One of
the more intense suggestions is to use data mining only when there is
probable cause and the investigation is so imminent that only
"aggressive preventative strategies" are required.323 However, more
moderate proposals have been put forth. These suggestions deal with
changes in technology, increasing transparency, and requiring greater
third party oversight.
First, more secure technology has been strongly suggested. Three
technology features that could promote privacy are anonymization of
data, required authorization for access, and built-in audit logs. By
anonymizing the data, the information could be accessed, but a
specific name or identification would not be placed with it until
324
necessary. The benefit of this would be that personally identifiable
information does not flow between sources. The information is not
labeled or attached to a particular name. This would reduce the
possibility of the identity theft and information misuse problems. The
technology used to anonymize data is referred to as "one-way
hashing," which scrambles the information so it can not be easily
325connected. Access restriction can be used to prevent unwanted users
from obtaining information. 326 Database access could be even further
restricted so that users would be required to enter the purpose of their
search, and would only receive related data and results while all other
information would be restricted.327 Audit logs are often used to track
user access with many different technologies. They could be used in
data mining systems to ensure that users were not accessing
inappropriate information or otherwise abusing the system. This
would require a neutral party to review the logs to ensure that the
searches were not outside the bounds of appropriateness.
323 Taipale, supra note 152, at 5.
324 Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 179, at 8; Associated Press, supra note 217.
325 Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 179, at 8.
326 Associated Press, supra note 217; Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 179, at 32.
327 Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 179, at 13.
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Second, increased transparency of how the process works and what
information is being mined would increase the privacy that some feel
is violated by using these programs. Currently, the general public does
not have information on the processes used by the government to
obtain information on citizens; therefore, there is little debate and
input from those outside of the system creators and a select number of
policy analysts. 328 Without this input, the designers do not have all the
necessary information and cannot make the most informed decisions
on how to design the data mining program to protect the citizens'
privacy interests. It has been suggested that the Fair Information
Practices should apply to data mining.329 There should be notification
that the information is being used, a limit on how long the information
can be retained, and the quality of the data must be examined.33 °
These practices, specifically the notification requirement, would
increase the transparency of data mining projects to the public. The
implementation of these suggestions may be highly dependent on cost
and logistical practicability.
Third, neutral oversight of data mining projects could be helpful in
balancing valuable technologies in data mining against privacy
protection. Congressional review could provide a layer of
accountability before a data mining project is funded or implemented
by a federal agency. 331  Large data mining users, such as the
Department of Defense, may wish to apply administrative procedures
that must be followed when it uses data mining.332 The Privacy and
Civil Liberties Board may wish to determine a model set of procedures
for agencies and departments to follow. Another form of review
would be to require judicial review of data mining programs. Courts
would determine whether the process was in accordance with due
process, and would be especially useful when the data mining involves
personally identifiable information. 333
328 Anderson, supra note 203, at 16.
329 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY'S GAP: THE LARGELY NoN-EXISTENT
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT MINING OF COMMERCIAL DATA 13 (May 28, 2003),
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030528cdt.pdf.
330 Dempsey, supra note 176, at 9.
331 Seifert, supra note 160, at 13; Taipale, supra note 152, at 5.
332 Anderson, supra note 203, at 14.
333 Pear, supra note 165; Taipale, supra note 152, at 5.
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B. FUTURE LAWSUITS REGARDING GOVERNMENT DATA MINING
Few lawsuits have arisen despite the controversy of data mining.
However, as data mining becomes more common, legal disputes will
undoubtedly surface. Two types of disputes may dominate this field.
First, there will likely be requests to restrict admissibility of evidence
obtained solely through data mining. 334 These court requests will be
based on the theory that the evidence was obtained without probable
cause and constituted an unreasonable search, thereby violating the
Fourth Amendment. Second, corrective lawsuits may be brought
seeking damages caused by misidentification. For example, if an
individual is placed on a no fly list or a watch list and this causes
damages, like not obtaining a job or losing a business contract, the
person will likely be able to seek restitution for the injury. These
potential legal challenges should prompt data mining initiatives to
continue to work on minimizing privacy concerns and the use of
accurate data.
V. GOVERNMENT DATA MINING FROM PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
The government collects a vast amount of data on its own.
However, it also recognizes that private institutions in the United
States gather data from individuals during daily business activities that
could be useful for government purposes. Therefore, the government
obtains data and data mining services from commercial providers.
This extra data can give the government more information about one
individual or more parameters with which to do pattern searches.
There are less regulations on data collection by private institutions
than by the government, so there are concerns that the government
uses private institutions to avoid these restrictions.
A. USE OF INFORMATION FROM PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
The government can easily find commercial data aggregators from
whom to purchase data or data mining and all levels of government are
willing to do so. 33 5 According to the 2004 GAO report, fifty-four
government data mining projects use private sector data. Of these
projects, thirty-six involve the government obtaining personal data,
334 Anderson, supra note 203.
335 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 148.
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such as social security numbers and driver's license numbers, from
commercial information. 336 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service "queries private sector databases 20,000 times a month.,
337
Not only is the government using these databases, but the usage is
increasing. The FBI's use of commercial database information grew
9,600 percent between 1992 and 2003.338
Although purchasing data from commercial sources is common,
government agencies and commercial databases may have incentive
not to share information. If the government is working on an
investigation of top priority, it may wish to avoid commercial sources
in order to preserve the secrecy of its operation. Through the request
of certain information, the provider may be able to deduce who the
individuals of interest are and who is being investigated. This may
enable commercial aggregators or their employees to jeopardize
investigations by tipping off targets.339 On the contrary, commercial
databases may not wish to provide their information to the
government. Businesses worry that if customers know that their
information may be provided to the government, they will give false
information. 340 This will ultimately reduce the value of the results for
both the commercial user and the government.
B. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of individuals against
government intrusion, but not against the private sector. Therefore, a
conflict arises when the government obtains information that was
gathered by commercial aggregators, as to whether there is a Fourth
Amendment violation. Private companies are not accountable to the
same extent that the government is, so there are concerns that the
government can use this process as a backdoor method of obtaining
33 6 Id. at 10.
337 Declan McCullagh, JetBlue Privacy - Under Federal Wings?, NEWS.COM (Sept. 23, 2003),
at http://news.com.com/JetBlue+privacy--under+federal+wings/2010-1029_3-
5080339.html?taag=nl.
338 Dempsey, supra note 176, at 10.
339 Id. at 7.
340 Id. at 7.
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information that it could not collect itself.341 Consumers do not have
an expectation of privacy regarding the information that they divulge
to businesses.342 The Supreme Court has stated that the individual has
no protection under the Constitution because this information was
knowingly exposed.343 However, some argue that this decision was
given before the rapid expansion in technological capabilities and the
ease and efficiency of sharing data could not have been foreseen by the
Court at that time.
The Privacy Act of 1974 provides little restraint on the data mining
from commercial aggregators.34 5  The government can obtain data
mining services from the private sector without invoking the Privacy
Act because the information is not actually part of the government's
database.346 Many see this as a loophole of the Privacy Act that allows
the government to have full use of information that it cannot legally
obtain on its own. 3 4 7 They believe that at the time of the Privacy Act,
Congress could not anticipate the growth in information technology,
which is the reason for not 3 placing restrictions on obtaining
information from private sources.
A recent investigation into the role of the Privacy Act of 1974 in
private sector and government information sharing resulted from a
data transfer from the airline, JetBlue. JetBlue gave personal records
of five million customers in early 2002 to Torch Concepts, a private
contractor that provides data mining services to the Department of
Defense.349  This deal was negotiated between JetBlue and the
341 Peter Jennings, supra note 157.
342 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 329, at 2; Anderson, supra note 203,
at 14.
341 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 329, at 2.
344 Dempsey, supra note 176, at 10.
341 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 329, at 1; Anderson, supra note 203,
at 14.
346 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 329, at 3.
347 Anderson, supra note 203, at 14.
348 McCullagh, supra note 337.
349 Blumenthal, supra note 219; Id.
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Transportation Security Administration. 350  After a thorough
investigation, the Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office
found that there was not a violation of the Privacy Act by the
Transportation Security Administration. However, it did specify that
obtaining the data by negotiating directly with the data owner was not
within the spirit of the Privacy Act.3
51
In order to protect citizens from a backdoor invasion of privacy,
several changes have been recommended. A stringent change would
be to adapt the Privacy Act and the Fair Information Practices to apply
to commercial databases.3 52 Many feel that because these rules are
focused on upholding the Fourth Amendment right against government
intrusion, that they, as well as other restrictions, should not be applied
to the private sector. Instead, restrictions should be placed on what
information the govermment can obtain and how it can obtain it.353 For
example, government agencies could be required to disclose which
private sector databases they have purchased and will be using.354
Another suggestion is that government agencies undergo Privacy
Impact Assessments before engaging in any data mining. 55 These
assessments would require a close look at the source of the data and
the potential invasions of privacy rights that may occur if the data
mining occurs.
VI. THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT DATA MINING AND CONCLUSIONS
It is undeniable that most data mining techniques are useful
processes that must be considered as viable and efficient methods for
investigation and problem solving. It is also undeniable that most data
mining invokes a certain level of privacy concerns. Finding the
delicate balance between privacy and usefulness will be a goal for
government agencies and privacy advocates to work out. As
... DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIVACY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PUBLIC ON EVENTS
SURROUNDING JETBLuE DATA TRANSFER 9 (Feb. 20, 2004), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
airtravel/jetblue/dhsreport.pdf.
351 Id at 9.
352 Dempsey, supra note 176, at 14.
353 McCullagh, supra note 337.
354 id
355 Dempsey, supra note 176, at 8.
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technology continues to advance, there will be additional likelihood
that the balance will continually be in flux. The Privacy and Civil
Liberties Board, Director of National Intelligence, and Department of
Homeland Security Privacy Officer, among others, will be responsible
for putting procedures and safeguards in place that will allow the
government to stay abreast of these changes.
It is uncertain as to whether changes will be made in the TIA to
make it acceptable to receive additional Congressional funding. Most
likely, the technologies being developed by the TIA will continue to be
disseminated to other government agencies and promoted for various
purposes, some of which will be similar to the anti-terrorism purposes
of the TIA. The Director of National Intelligence must be appointed,
according to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004. This director will likely evaluate the current intelligence
communities and determine how and to what extent data mining will
be used. These data mining efforts will be more conscious of privacy
protections due to the controversy over the TIA and the
implementation of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. It is likely
that privacy advocates will closely watch the Information Sharing
Environment that is being created under this bill to ensure that it does
not pose privacy threats similar to those found in the TLA..
On the state level, the MATRIX program will likely continue to
decline as states realize not only the privacy concerns, but the budget
strain that the program imposes. States may be more likely to rely on
federal government initiatives to fight terrorism and limit data mining
to internal uses like service and process improvements. However,
state governments may continue to use the services of outside
contractors, like Seisint, to obtain data for the functions that will
require data mining. Both state and local governments will continue to
use private contractors with private databases to obtain larger amounts
of data and save money on system development and data collection.
As this trend increases, Congress will likely propose amendments to
the Privacy Act of 1974 that will impose accountability obligations
and regulations on government entities that obtain information from
private data mining sources.
The trend toward the increasing use of data mining will likely
continue, as organizations, both commercial and public, realize the
capabilities of such programs and the opportunities it provides in many
areas, not simply in anti-terrorism and law enforcement. However,
these progressions will likely be faced with increased governmental
control in the form of regulations, congressional action, and potential
judicial review. Governmental data mining will continue to be a
source of debate and development as technological advances must fird
their fit within the Fourth Amendment privacy protections.
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CONCLUSION
New technologies allow government agencies to collect more
personal information about citizens. Every time a new technology
comes into place, new kinds of privacy concerns are raised.
Government agencies often need to promote and adopt new
technologies to ensure citizen safety on airplanes and elsewhere. They
also need to encourage citizen to use the electronic tools. Congress
provides extra measures to protect individual privacy when the
government agencies start new electronic programs, even though they
do not always address all concerns raised by the public.
The new laws mandating PIA and GAO's authorization before
government agencies implement new electronic programs ensure that
agencies consider their privacy implications, and inform the public
of their privacy rights when they collect information about
individuals. On government websites, all federal agencies are required
to notify the public about their privacy policies, and many states
follow the same practice. Even with these laws, however, the public is
still concerned about its privacy when the government collects
individual information from airline passenger records. Public interest
organizations, like the ACLU and the National Business Travel
Association, ask the agencies to modify some of the controversial
agency practices, such as the use of commercial databases to identify
persons with a high risk of conducting terrorism and lack of proper
redress systems under the CAPPS II. These concerns eventually led
the TSA to abandon the program in 2004. Instead, Secure Flight was
created to answer most of these concerns. However, this program also
was the subject of privacy concerns from the public. It is not
clear how the TSA will ensure that the new program is properly
implemented step-by-step in accordance with the PIAs and other laws.
In order to obtain public approval, the TSA and other government
agencies need to balance better security with policies and procedures
that protect privacy.
Data mining has established itself as a valuable product for a
variety of commercial and government purposes. Therefore, state and
local governments will need to determine how to gather information,
design data mining programs, and implement these programs in a
fashion that accounts for the concerns of individual citizens. Programs
like the TIA will continue to be developed but can benefit by
considering some of the technological, transparency, and oversight
suggestions that can protect the information mined and the knowledge
gathered from data mining systems. The privacy oversight officials
and boards put into place by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
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Prevention Act of 2004 will be responsible for ensuring that either
these safeguards or more effective techniques are used. The MATRIX
is likely to continue to be scrutinized for its federal involvement, and
may lose additional members based on the large expense the program
to states. Amendments to the Privacy Act of 1974 have the potential
to influence the way that the government accesses data from private
contractors. The data mining versus privacy debate may only be
starting, and additional concerns will continue to appear and be
addressed with each new data mining program and new technologies
developed.
As analyzed in this article, new government programs can intrude
on the privacy of citizens. Many citizens and public interest
organizations see the need of extra security to make the country safe in
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. However, privacy is
one of the most important and fundamental rights of citizens and
is protected under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution. Therefore, the government must ensure that it balances
better security with privacy protection. In the future, new technologies
would allow government agencies to access more diverse information
about citizens. Each time an agency adopts a new technology or new
method of collecting information, it needs to consider if privacy will
be protected, and ensure that there is an option either to abandon the
new measure or provide an additional law or other measures to secure
privacy.
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